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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1958
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
Amount of Recovery: Note Purchased at Discount
In National Equity Discount & Loan Co. v. Jackson,1 the plaintiff
bought a note in the amount of $348A5 for $150. Although the trial
court found that the maker had no defense to the note, he nevertheless
gave judgment for only $150, plus interest. This startling decision was
reversed by the court of appeals, which held, correctly, that in the absence
of any defense, the holder is entitled to collect the full amount due on
the instrument. The court also indicated correctly that even if there are
defenses, the holder in due course is entitled to collect the full amount.2
No reference was made to the Negotiable Instruments Law.
Holder In Due Course: Taking Incomplete Instrument
Ohio Revised Code section 1301.54 s defines a holder in due course as
a holder who has taken the instrument under certain conditions, the first
of which is that it be complete on its face. Correctly interpreting the
statute (if, indeed, there is room for interpretation in the situation pre-
sented), the court of appeals in Salter v. Mutual Finance Co.4 held that
a finance company which purchaseed an incomplete instrument was not
a holder in due course even though in fact the company took in good
faith.5
Holder In Due Course: Bad Faith: Constructive Notice
Ohio Revised Code section 1301.58," dealing with the question of
what constitutes notice of an infirmity in the instrument or defect in the
tide of the person negotiating it, provides that to constitute the above,
the person to whom the instrument is negotiated "must have had actual
1. 105 Ohio App. 278, 151 N.E.2d 914 (1957).
2. There is an exception in the case of a note taken as security, but the exception
is not involved in the instant case.
3. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 52.
4. 106 Ohio App. 20, 153 N.E.2d 216 (1957).
5. The opposite result was reached in First Discount Corp. v. Hatcher Auto Sales,
Inc., 156 Ohio St. 191, 102 N.E.2d 4 (1951), abstracted in the 1952 Survey, 4
WEST. RES. L Ruv. 246 (1953). The decision is criticized in 21 U. CINc. L. REv.
207 (1952) and is also discussed in 13 OHIO ST. L. J. 294 (1952). As pointed out
in the concurring opinion of Judge Taft, it was unnecessary to decide the issue of
holder in due course, as the suit was against the indorser and based on his warranty
that all prior parties had capacity to contract.
6. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 56.
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knowledge of the infirmity or defect, or knowledge of such facts that his
action in taking the instrument amounted to bad faith."
The last phrase is the troublesome one. In general, however, the doc-
trine of constructive notice does not apply in this area.7  Yet in Botzum
Bros. v. Brown Lumber Co.,8 the court made use of the doctrine in de-
ciding that the planitiff9 was not a holder in due course. The case arose
under an FHA (Federal Housing Administration) loan, in which Brem-
son, the payee of the notes under the trade name Nu Homes, was doing
construction work for the defendants. The plaintiff, a savings and loan
association, was the financial institution advancing the money needed to
pay Bremson.
The plaintiff claimed to be a holder in due course of the notes. Un-
der FHA regulations, known to the plaintiff, the latter was not authorized
to disburse the proceeds of a loan until it had obtained completion cer-
rfficates, one of which was to be signed by the borrower. Bremson forged
the names of the two borrowers (the makers of the notes), and on the
strength of the certificates, not knowing of the forgery, the plaintiff dis-
bursed the money to Bremson. The court held that under Ohio Revised
Code section 1301.58, referred to above, the plaintiff had knowledge of
such facts that its action in taking the instruments amounted to bad faith.
Consequently, the plaintiff was not a holder in due course and was there-
fore subject to the defense which the makers had against the payee. The
court stated that the FHA regulation requiring a completion certificate
signed by the borrower was adopted for the protection of borrowers and
was a limitation on the authority of the plaintiff to make a disbursement
on the loan. When plaintiff paid out on forged certificates, reasoned
the court, it was the same as though there were no certificates at all.
The opinion is not entirely clear to me because, after the above un-
qualified statements, the court indicated that the duty of plaintiff was to
take reasonable precautions to ascertain that the borrowers' completion
certificates were genuine, and that the conduct of plaintiff, in view of the
knowledge which its officer had, amounted to a taking in bad faith. But
the only pertinent knowledge which the officer had was that payments
could not be made except on the strength of the certificates, and the only
pertinent "conduct" which the court could have intended to denounce,
was the failure to inquire of the borrowers whether the work had been
7. BRiTroN, BILLS AND NoTEs § 112 (1943).
8. 104 Ohio App. 507, 150 N.E.2d 485 (1957).
9. For the sake of simplicity I have designated this party as plaintiff, although tech-
nically he was a cross-petitioner.
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satisfactorily completed or whether they had in fact signed the comple-
tion certificates. 10 Thus, in effect, the court appears to be holding that
plaintiff was on constructive notice of the fact that the certificates were
forged.
Want of Consideration: Burden of Proof
Ohio Revised Code section 1301.3011 makes absence of consideration
a matter of defense against any person not a holder in due course. Al-
though the section says nothing about burden of proof, the weight of
authority is that the section places the burden of proof on the defendant.12
In connection with a promissory note issued before the effective date
of the Negotiable Instruments Law in Ohio, the Supreme Court of Ohio
held that the burden of proof was on the plaintiff (usually the payee) to
establish consideration where it was denied.' 3 So far as I know, there has
been no Supreme Court decision under the Negotiable Instruments Law.
In Lucas v. Rosenacker,14 the court said that the burden of proving
the defense of want of consideration is placed upon the defendant by
Ohio Revised Code section 1301.30. As authority, the court cited Darby
v. Chambers,15 which contains an excellent discussion of the subject.
Discharge of Principal Obligor: Effect
On Accommodation Maker
In Economy Savings & Loan Co. v. Weir,16 the court held that where
the principal obligor is discharged by reason of an act done by the credi-
tor, the accommodation maker is likewise discharged. The court relied
upon Ohio Revised Code section 1303.34 (D),'1 7 which provides
10. There is an implication in the opinion that the certificates were presented and
the disbursements made so promptly that plaintiff's officer should have realized that
the construction could not have been completed, but it is doubtful that this was of
much significance in the mind of the court. An alternative ground for the decision
is based upon an F.HA regulation requiring the lender to obtain a written authoriza-
tion from the borrower if the lender is the payee of the note. The court said that
while Nu Homes was nominally the payee, plaintiff, under the circumstances of this
case, was the real payee.
11. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 28.
12. BRITrON, BILLS Am NoTEs § 99 (1943).
13. Ginn v. Dolan, 81 Ohio St. 121, 90 N.E. 141 (1909).
14. 106 Ohio App. 116, 149 N.E.2d 755 (1957).
15. 70 Ohio App. 287, 46 N.E.2d 302 (1942). The Ohio cases are in conflict.
There appears to be no reason to cite any more of them here, as they may be easily
found.
16. 105 Ohio App. 531, 153 N.E.2d 155 (1957).
17. NEroTIABLE INSTRUMENTs LAw § 119.
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